Question by Jon B: Kerensky and the Russian Revolution?
I’m writing an analytical paper on what other options Kerensky and the Provisional Government had in dealing with the left and right coups? Specifically could they have done better if they had not armed the left to help them with Kornilov’s coup, or was that really the best course of action?
Answers and Views:
Answer by Monc
Obviously, they could have done better, or they would have won the civil war.
I think they needed to sell themselves better to the people once they took power. That was Lenin’s power. He knew how to reach the hearts of the proletariat.
Kerensky should probably have set up the right and left to fight each other off and instead spent his time maintaining order and amassing popularily (and weapons).
By trying to take sides, he gave away his advantage as the status quo to Lenin and ended up being toppled.
Read all the answers in the comments.
What do you think?
leightonmowbray says
Unlike some of the more radical socialists, he supported Russia's participation in World War I. He became increasingly disappointed with the tsarist regime's conduct of the war effort, however, and, when the February Revolution broke out, he urged the dissolution of the monarchy. He enthusiastically accepted the posts of vice chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of minister of justice in the provisional government, formed by the Duma. The only person to hold positions in both governing bodies, he assumed the role of liaison between them. He instituted basic civil liberties–e.g., the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and religion; universal suffrage; and equal rights for women–throughout Russia and became one of the most widely known and popular figures among the revolutionary leadership.
In May, when a public uproar over the announcement of Russia's war aims (which Kerensky had approved) forced several ministers to resign, Kerensky was transferred to the posts of minister of war and of the navy and became the dominant personality in the new government. He subsequently planned a new offensive and toured the front, using his inspiring rhetoric to instill in the demoralized troops a desire to renew their efforts and defend the revolution. His eloquence, however, proved inadequate compensation for war weariness and lack of military discipline. Kerensky's June Offensive was an unmitigated failure.
When the provisional government was again compelled to reorganize in July, Kerensky, who adhered to no rigid political dogma and whose dramatic oratorical style appeared to win him broad popular support, became prime minister. Despite his efforts to unite all political factions, he soon alienated the moderates and the officers' corps by summarily dismissing his commander in chief, General Lavr G. Kornilov, and personally replacing him. He also lost the confidence of the left wing by refusing to implement their radical social and economic programs and by apparently planning to assume dictatorial powers.
Consequently, when the Bolsheviks seized power, Kerensky, who escaped to the front, was unable to gather forces to defend his government.